While we’re not in the habit of filing bar complaints against lawyers and judges (in fact, we’ve never done so until last night), the behavior of Judge David Fried called for it. After receiving a series of tips from different individuals about his behavior in the courtroom and outside of the courtroom, we began our investigation.
Our job is to ensure the public and lawyers are safe from government actors, and this includes judges. Now more than ever, after the release of the Epstein files that truly show there is a class of elites attempting to “rule over us” with a different set of rules that apply to them, we will continue to call out and attempt to eradicate judicial and political abuse.
Our letter to the Commission on Judicial Conduct is published below. We will keep the public apprised of any updates.
Commission on Judicial Conduct,
My name is Favour Inegbenehi and I’m the associate editor of The Ethics Reporter (“TER”). I am not represented by a lawyer. TER is an online news website and blog that exclusively focuses on reporting ethics violations of lawyers and judges, investigating ethics violations committed by lawyers and judges, and holding members of the legal profession accountable (including law schools) for promoting the pursuit of a career in the law when most reports show that artificial intelligence will make lawyers (and judges) obsolete within a decade. Our goal, through honest reporting, is to protect the public from lawyers and judges, and perhaps more importantly, protect lawyers and members of the public from unscrupulous judges who either abuse their power or attempt to abuse their power.
I am not an attorney and do not represent any party but myself in filing this Complaint. As a reporter, I receive tips through our website on judges, lawyers and law schools. We do not pursue all tips, but we did begin to pursue a series of tips on Judge David Fried’s behavior late last year.
Judge David Fried is a judge in Rockland County, which has a strong Ultra-Orthodox Jewish community. One member of said Ultra-Orthodox community sent a tip in late October through our website contact form and said, “If your name is not Jewish he rules against you…And if it is Jewish and the other side is Jewish it depends which Jew he is better friends with…So if we make a judicial complaint against him for this we won’t get him on other cases but news like that gets to all other judges very quickly…” Exhibit A, Text Exchange with Source. When I pressed the source for additional information, he stated that Judge Fried can be “talked to” and is “willing to play ball.” This suggested to me that Judge Fried was amenable to bribes or some other form of quid pro quo.
In and of itself, this is nothing that is going to be worth investigating as a journalist. It’s simply not enough to go off of. However, the next month I received a second tip about Judge Fried. This time, it was from a per diem lawyer who stated that Judge Fried was intimidating lawyers in the courtroom, especially if they happened to be per diem counsel. The source alleged that Judge Fried mocked per diem lawyers, denigrated them when they appeared in courtrooms and created a hostile environment for anyone appearing “per diem.”
It is not uncommon to receive more than one tip especially about judges, but it is somewhat uncommon to receive three different tips from three distinct sources about a single judge in a short period of time. Last month, I received a tip from a source who stated that David Fried told a group of rabbis the way he would rule in a case the night before the ruling came down. Obviously, this would be highly improper and in combination with the other two tips from distinct sources, I began attending hearings in his courtroom personally and have had volunteers attend hearings in his courtroom as well.
Inherently, a judge commands significant power. Judge Fried particularly appears to the public to be “powerful” from his online footprint and resume. He boasts a relationship with Epstein associates, Hilary Clinton and Bill Clinton. He is pictured next to Governor Hochul online and claims to be the “voice” of LGBTQ+ Judges and Their Allies. Using that power to curry favor with your own ethnic group, or within your own community, however, is the kind of per se unethical behavior that we seek to identify and root out.
I attended a hearing on January 28, 2026 and was appalled by the demeanor, tone and threats that Judge Fried made against a lawyer. Interestingly and coincidentally, the issue of his treatment of per diem lawyers that I had received a tip about was directly addressed during this hearing.
The lawyers appeared for what was supposed to be an inquest proceeding, according to the public docket. Docket number 42 states:
ORDERED, that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED, that the Rockland County Clerk is directed to cancel and discharge of record, the Notice of Pendency/ Lis Pendens filed herein (Inst. No. 2020-00016927), related to the real property located at 12 Zeck Court, Suffern, New York 10901; and it is further ORDERED, that costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney’s fees, if any, occasioned by the Filing and cancellation of the aforesaid Notice of Pendency/Lis Pendens (lnst. No. 2020-0001(1927) are AWARDED to the Defendants; and it is further ORDERED, that an Inquest is scheduled to be conducted to determine the amount of the aforesaid award for costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney’s fees, if any, occasioned by the filing and cancellation of thc aforesaid Notice of Pendency/Lis Pendens (lnst. No. 2020-0001,6927) on January 28, 2026 at 9:15 am, as provided for herein. The Inquest will be conducted in-person.
I did not know that the hearing was an Inquest because Judge Fried seemed so focused on Plaintiff’s lawyer, who appeared virtually. I only learned that this was noticed for Inquest after witnessing this totally inappropriate hearing where Judge Fried, similar to the Epstein associates for whom he proudly worked, behaved as though he was “above the law.”
The purpose of this complaint is to provide a detailed, citation-supported analysis of Judge Fried’s judicial ethics violations and due process defects under New York law arising from (1) intimidation of counsel for lawful advocacy and record clarification, (2) hostility toward and discouragement of per diem counsel, (3) coercive threats of sanctions and quid pro quo conduct during a non-sanctions proceeding, and (4) failure to follow required procedures for attorney sanctions. The record for this case is available at 035769/2025 – Rockland County Supreme Court, Adler v. Pollak.
- FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This memorandum addresses judicial conduct directed at Plaintiff’s counsel during an inquest proceeding, including hostility toward lawful advocacy, discouragement of record preservation, and coercive statements made in open court. The events described below arose after Plaintiff’s counsel made routine, good-faith efforts to arrange coverage and seek guidance regarding appearance logistics (i.e., arranging for per diem counsel) and subsequently attempted to clarify the procedural record.
According to NYSCEF filings, Plaintiff’s counsel in this matter retained per diem counsel to appear at a scheduled, in-person inquest. Plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to the Court asking the Court to confirm that it would allow for per diem counsel to appear. See dkt. 44. According to Plaintiff’s counsel during the scheduled inquest hearing, two separate per diem lawyers advised her that they would not appear absent express court approval due to prior hostile treatment of per diem counsel by the presiding judge, David Fried. These alleged opinions of per diem counsel are consistent with the tips that I received from sources regarding David Fried’s hostility toward and treatment of per diem lawyers.
The Court denied the request, citing noncompliance with Part 125. Dkt. 45. Part 125 governs claims of actual engagement or conflicting trial appearances and did not apply to the circumstances presented, which involved substitute coverage and appearance logistics rather than an actual-engagement claim.
After reviewing Part 125 and the Court’s Individual Part Rules, plaintiff’s counsel’s staff submitted a second letter requesting permission for per diem counsel to appear or permission for plaintiff’s counsel to appear virtually due to emergent circumstances. The Court responded by stating that the submission was repetitive and that it had already ruled, without addressing the request for virtual appearance or clarifying whether per diem counsel was permitted to appear. Dkts. 46-47.
Because earlier filings had been submitted by staff under time-sensitive conditions, plaintiff’s counsel later submitted a clarifying letter to ensure (according to her) the NYSCEF record accurately reflected the procedural posture and the purpose of the prior requests. During the ensuing in-person proceeding, Judge Fried reacted angrily to the fact that counsel submitted a clarifying letter, accused her of attempting to “create a record” suggesting an abuse of discretion by Judge David Fried, and expressed hostility toward counsel’s efforts to preserve and clarify the record.
In open court, Judge Fried raised his voice, pointed at counsel menacingly, questioned counsel’s motives for making lawful filings, and repeatedly warned counsel to “be careful” how she answered questions, explicitly tying potential sanctions to counsel’s responses. No notice of sanctions hearing had been issued according to the record, no order to show cause had been filed, and the proceeding had been noticed as an inquest, not as a disciplinary or sanctions hearing.
I have never previously filed a complaint against any judge or lawyer. My job as a journalist is to report on ethics violations and investigate them. Never before have I seen a judge in real time display hostility and bias that align with several accusations lodged against him previously through the “tips” section of my website. For these reasons, I’ve chosen to file a complaint against Judge Fried.
Later on in the hearing, Judge Fried asked plaintiff’s counsel if she thought her statement in a brief was a material omission of fact. He repeated the question several times and stated, “be very careful how you answer” and stated he was weighing whether to issue sanctions against her, clearly based on the way she chose to answer. He pointed at her, raised his voice and displayed hostility and personal animus that I’ve never seen from a judge after personally sitting in on over 150 hearings in the past six months.
These events form the basis for the concerns addressed in this memorandum regarding judicial intimidation, hostility toward per diem counsel, interference with record preservation, and the use of coercive threats outside established procedural safeguards.
- Governing Ethical Rules
Judges in New York are bound by the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct (22 NYCRR Part 100), which impose obligations far stricter than those applicable to advocates.
Relevant provisions include:
22 NYCRR § 100.1: Judges must uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.
22 NYCRR § 100.2(A): Judges must avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.
22 NYCRR § 100.3(B)(3): Judges shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to lawyers.
22 NYCRR § 100.3(B)(6): Judges must accord every person the right to be heard according to law.
- Governing New York Case Law
Intimidation of Counsel and Chilling of Lawful Advocacy
Judges unquestionably possess authority to insist upon order and decorum in the courtroom (see Rule 100.3[B][2]). That authority, however, is not absolute. It must be exercised in a manner that remains patient, dignified, and courteous toward those appearing before the court (see Rule 100.3[B][3]). As the Court of Appeals has cautioned, “respect for the judiciary is better fostered by temperate conduct, not hot-headed reactions” (Matter of Cerbone, 61 N.Y.2d 93, 96, 472 N.Y.S.2d 76, 460 N.E.2d 217 [1984]).
Those principles are directly implicated here. Plaintiff’s counsel did not engage in disruptive conduct or defiance of the Court. In fact, she apologized and was deferent to the Court throughout the hearing, seemingly in an effort to diffuse the situation and calm Judge Fried down. In reaction, Judge Fried chided her for her deference and apologies. Counsel undertook routine, good-faith efforts to address appearance logistics in advance of a scheduled inquest, including seeking confirmation that per diem counsel would be permitted to appear or, alternatively, that counsel could appear virtually due to emergent circumstances. When those requests were denied without addressing either issue, counsel submitted a clarifying letter to ensure that the procedural record accurately reflected what had occurred. As already explained above, Judge Fried acted in a hostile manner that infected the remainder of the proceedings. He was clearly angered that Plaintiff’s counsel wrote a letter that protected her client’s interests, because in his view, Plaintiff’s counsel was suggesting that Judge Fried was abusing his discretion by denying her request to appear virtually.
A judge’s response to such advocacy must be guided not only by decorum, but by fidelity to the law. Judges are required to respect and comply with the law and to be faithful and competent in it (see Rules 100.2[A]; 100.3[B][1]). The Court of Appeals has made clear that legal error and judicial misconduct are not mutually exclusive, and that “a pattern of fundamental legal error may be ‘serious misconduct’” (Matter of Jung, 11 N.Y.3d 365, 373, 870 N.Y.S.2d 819, 899 N.E.2d 925 [2008], quoting Matter of Reeves, 63 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 480 N.Y.S.2d 463, 469 N.E.2d 1321 [1984]).
Against that backdrop, Judge Fried’s alleged reaction to the clarifying letter raises ethical concerns. According to the record, the Court responded in open court with anger, accused counsel of attempting to “create a record” suggesting an abuse of discretion, and questioned counsel’s motives for submitting the letter. This was the first item he addressed during the inquest hearing, and clearly impacted how he treated Plaintiff’s counsel throughout the rest of the hearing. The focus of the Court’s remarks was not on correcting any inaccuracy or enforcing a clear procedural rule, but on discouraging the act of memorializing the procedural history itself.
That reaction implicates another core ethical obligation: the right to be heard. “The right to be heard is fundamental to our system of justice,” and judges must “accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard” (Rule 100.3[B][6]; Matter of Jung, 11 N.Y.3d at 372–373). Clarifying the record—particularly where prior submissions have not been addressed—is a basic mechanism by which counsel exercises that right on their own behalf and on behalf of their clients.
When a judge reacts with hostility to record clarification and frames it as an improper attempt to impugn judicial discretion, the effect is not merely discourteous. It risks chilling lawful advocacy by signaling that efforts to preserve the record may provoke retaliation or hostility. The ethical concern, therefore, is not limited to tone, but to the practical impact on counsel’s willingness to engage in ordinary, lawful advocacy in future proceedings.
Moreover, the Court’s characterization of record preservation as an attempt to “create a record” suggesting abuse of discretion is itself troubling. Creating a record is not misconduct; it is an essential function of advocacy and a prerequisite to meaningful review. Treating that function as suspect or provocative undermines transparency and is inconsistent with the obligation to remain patient, dignified, and faithful to the law.
Viewed as a whole, the conduct alleged here does not reflect a momentary lapse or a judge merely enforcing decorum. It arose directly from counsel’s lawful efforts to seek clarification, preserve the procedural history, and ensure compliance with the Court’s expectations. Under Jung, even if the Court believed it was acting within its discretion, conduct that discourages the exercise of fundamental rights and chills lawful advocacy may constitute judicial misconduct rather than mere legal error.
Hostility Toward and Discouragement of Per Diem Counsel
Judges are held to a higher standard of conduct than the public at large precisely because their demeanor and treatment of others in the courtroom affects public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary (Matter of Going, 97 N.Y.2d 127, 127, 735 N.Y.S.2d 893, 761 N.E.2d 585 [2002]). That heightened standard requires judges not only to apply the law correctly, but to conduct themselves in a manner that promotes fairness, access to justice, and respect for the judicial process (Rule 100.2[A]). Consistent with these principles, judges must remain patient, dignified, and courteous to those with whom they deal in an official capacity, including lawyers appearing before them (Rule 100.3[B][3]).
Those obligations are directly implicated where judicial conduct discourages lawful participation by a category of attorneys. Here, main counsel sought to proceed with an in-person inquest by arranging for experienced per diem counsel to appear. That request was not unusual, obstructive, or made in bad faith. Per diem coverage is a routine and necessary component of solo and small-firm practice, particularly where counsel maintains an active calendar across multiple courts. The availability of per diem counsel allows litigants to retain affordable representation and ensures continuity of proceedings without unnecessary adjournments.
Despite this, two per diem lawyers declined to appear absent express court approval due to prior hostile treatment by Judge Fried. According to the information provided, that reluctance was based on recent firsthand accounts that Judge Fried had publicly mistreated per diem counsel. Per diem counsel was otherwise available, prepared, and willing to appear, but reasonably sought assurance that they would not be subjected to hostility or adverse consequences simply for appearing as per diem counsel. Again, these complaints align with distinct complaints of the very same nature that I received through my website, which prompted me to begin attending Judge Fried’s proceedings.
Judicial hostility that discourages attorneys from appearing in a particular courtroom raises ethical concerns beyond mere discourtesy. Judges are charged with promoting public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary through their own respect for the law and their conduct on the bench (Rule 100.2[A]). When attorneys decline to appear due to fear of hostile treatment, the effect is not limited to the attorneys themselves. It burdens litigants, particularly those represented by solo practitioners, and undermines access to justice by making it more difficult for clients to maintain representation that is both competent and affordable.
The Rules Governing Judicial Conduct do not permit differential treatment of attorneys based on their role or status. Per diem counsel are entitled to the same patience, dignity, and courtesy as any other lawyer appearing before the court (Rule 100.3[B][3]). Hostility toward per diem counsel, or conduct that creates a reputation for hostility such that attorneys refuse to appear absent special assurances, is inconsistent with the higher standard imposed on judges and risks eroding public confidence in the fairness and accessibility of the courts.
Viewed in context, the reluctance of per diem counsel to appear here was not speculative or hypothetical. It was a direct response to observed judicial behavior. When judicial conduct effectively discourages lawful participation by qualified attorneys, the issue is no longer one of courtroom management, but of ethical compliance. Under Going and Rule 100.3(B)(3), judges are obligated to conduct proceedings in a manner that does not deter attorneys from fulfilling their professional obligations or impair litigants’ ability to be represented.
Coercive Threats of Sanctions and Quid Pro Quo Conduct in Open Court
The ethical concerns raised by the Court’s conduct do not end with hostility toward lawful advocacy, “creating a record” or discouragement of per diem counsel. They are significantly heightened where judicial authority is exercised through coercive threats tied to how counsel answers questions in open court. The right to be heard is fundamental to our system of justice, and judges are obligated to afford that right to every lawyer appearing before them without intimidation or coercion (Rule 100.3[B][6]; Matter of Jung, 11 N.Y.3d 365, 372–373, 870 N.Y.S.2d 819, 899 N.E.2d 925 [2008]).
That principle is directly implicated here. According to the record, during an inquest proceeding Judge Fried became visibly angry, raised his voice, and repeatedly warned plaintiff’s counsel to “be careful” how she answered questions. He repeatedly asked whether a statement in her brief was a material omission of fact and warned her in a raised voice, with a menacing tone, that she should be very careful as to how she answered his questions. He pointed his finger at her and was extremely hostile. Those warnings were not framed as neutral reminders of evidentiary standards or procedural rules. Instead, they were explicitly coupled with threats that the Court was “weighing heavy sanctions” based on counsel’s next response. Judge Fried specifically threatened Plaintiff’s counsel’s with sanctions in connection with how she answered his questions.
Judicial authority may not be exercised in this manner. Judges are required to respect and comply with the law and to be faithful and competent in it (Rules 100.2[A]; 100.3[B][1]). The Court of Appeals has made clear that legal error and judicial misconduct are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and that a pattern of fundamental legal error may constitute serious misconduct (Matter of Jung, 11 N.Y.3d at 373, quoting Matter of Reeves, 63 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 480 N.Y.S.2d 463, 469 N.E.2d 1321 [1984]). Conditioning the threat of sanctions on the substance of counsel’s answers raises precisely that concern.
Here, the proceeding was noticed as an inquest, not as a sanctions or disciplinary hearing. No notice was given that counsel’s conduct was under review, and no procedural framework for sanctions was invoked. Nonetheless, Judge Fried threatened severe sanctions in real time, explicitly linking punitive consequences to whether counsel answered questions in a manner satisfactory to the Court.
Such conduct risks converting the proceeding from an adjudicative hearing into a coercive exchange. When a judge signals that a lawyer’s professional standing or exposure to sanctions depends on answering questions a certain way, the lawyer’s right to be heard is compromised. The pressure is not merely rhetorical; it creates a quid pro quo in which counsel is forced to choose between candor and self-protection.
The ethical problem is especially acute because the judge’s role is fundamentally different from that of an advocate. Judges are held to a higher standard of conduct than the public at large (Matter of Going, 97 N.Y.2d 127, 127, 735 N.Y.S.2d 893, 761 N.E.2d 585 [2002]), and must promote public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary through their own respect for the law (Rule 100.2[A]). Threatening sanctions as leverage during questioning undermines that confidence and risks the appearance that judicial power is being used to compel a preferred narrative rather than to adjudicate impartially.
The Court’s alleged conduct during the inquest cannot be dismissed as a momentary lapse or an isolated warning. It followed earlier hostility toward counsel’s lawful filings and occurred in a setting where no sanctions procedure had been invoked or noticed properly. Under Jung, even if the Court believed it was acting within its authority, the use of coercive threats that interfere with the fundamental right to be heard may constitute judicial misconduct rather than mere error.
The Commission’s Enforcement of Judicial Ethics in Practice: In re O’Connor
In In re O’Connor, the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct served the petitioner with a formal written complaint alleging multiple categories of misconduct arising from the judge’s conduct on the bench. The charges included that the judge failed to cooperate with the Commission’s investigation; was discourteous to lawyers in two civil cases by striking testimony after those lawyers said “okay” in response to witness answers and then failed to comply with the law by dismissing those cases; made impatient, discourteous, and undignified remarks to lawyers appearing before him in three bench trials; and sua sponte awarded or threatened to award “counsel fees” on multiple occasions without providing the parties the opportunity to be heard or setting forth the basis for the awards, in violation of established law. After the petitioner filed an answer denying wrongdoing, the Commission designated a Referee to report findings of fact and conclusions of law. Following a hearing, the Referee sustained all of the charges.
In re O’Connor, 30 N.Y.3d 673 (2018).
The Commission subsequently determined that the petitioner violated multiple provisions of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, including Rule 100.1, requiring judges to maintain and observe high standards of conduct to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary; Rule 100.2(A), mandating that judges respect and comply with the law and act in a manner promoting public confidence in judicial integrity; Rule 100.2(B), instructing that judges should not allow any type of relationship to affect judicial conduct; Rule 100.3(B)(1), obligating judges to be faithful to, and competent in, the law; and Rule 100.3(B)(3), requiring judges to be patient, dignified, and courteous to those with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. The Commission concluded that, “[v]iewed in its entirety, [the petitioner’s] conduct, seriously exacerbated by his failure to cooperate, demonstrate[d] his unfitness for judicial office and thus warrant[ed] the sanction of removal,” a determination that the Court of Appeals upheld.
In re O’Connor, 30 N.Y.3d 673 (2018).
The Commission’s decision in In re O’Connor is instructive because it demonstrates that judicial misconduct does not require corruption, bias, or criminality. Rather, the Commission focused on how judicial authority was exercised in the courtroom, particularly where a judge reacted punitively to lawyers, employed hostile or undignified demeanor, and used threats of fees or sanctions without affording the right to be heard. The misconduct sustained in O’Connor arose from the cumulative effect of courtroom behavior, coercive use of authority, and departures from established procedural safeguards.
Measured against that framework, the conduct at issue here raises similar ethical concerns. As in O’Connor, the alleged misconduct did not stem from an isolated ruling or discretionary decision, but from the manner in which the Court responded to counsel’s lawful conduct. Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in routine advocacy by filing correspondence to address appearance logistics and later to clarify the procedural record after prior requests were not substantively addressed. According to the record and based on my personal observations, Judge Fried reacted angrily to those efforts, accused counsel of attempting to “create a record” suggesting an abuse of discretion, and questioned counsel’s motives in open court. As O’Connor makes clear, discourteous and undignified treatment of lawyers, particularly where it targets lawful advocacy, may constitute ethical misconduct rather than permissible courtroom management.
The parallels are more pronounced with respect to the Court’s alleged use of coercive authority. In O’Connor, one of the sustained charges involved the judge’s sua sponte threats or awards of counsel fees without providing an opportunity to be heard or setting forth a lawful basis. Here, during a proceeding noticed as an inquest, Judge Fried warned counsel repeatedly to “be careful” how she answered questions and explicitly tied the threat of “heavy sanctions” to the substance of counsel’s next response. As in O’Connor, those threats were made without notice, without invocation of a sanctions procedure, and without affording counsel an opportunity to be heard on the issue of sanctions itself.
Additionally, the Commission in O’Connor treated the judge’s discourteous demeanor and coercive use of authority as aggravating factors that, viewed collectively, demonstrated unfitness for judicial office. In the present case, the alleged conduct similarly reflects a pattern rather than a single lapse: hostility toward lawful record clarification, discouragement of per diem counsel from appearing, and the use of sanction threats during an inquest proceeding. Taken together, these actions mirror the types of conduct the Commission found ethically impermissible in O’Connor.
Importantly, O’Connor underscores that judicial misconduct may be found even where a judge believes he is acting within his authority. The Commission rejected the notion that firm courtroom control or discretionary authority justifies hostile demeanor, coercive threats, or procedural shortcuts. Applying that reasoning here, even if Judge Fried believed his actions were intended to maintain control of the proceeding, the alleged conduct—when viewed in context—raises serious concerns under the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct because it interfered with counsel’s right to be heard, discouraged lawful advocacy, and employed the threat of sanctions outside established procedures.
For these reasons, In re O’Connor provides a concrete and relevant example of how the standards discussed above are enforced in practice and why the conduct alleged in this matter warrants careful ethical scrutiny.
- CONCLUSION
Under New York law and judicial ethics rules, the conduct described raises serious concerns, including:
- Judicial intimidation and chilling of lawful advocacy;
- Bias or hostility toward per diem counsel;
- Coercive threats of sanctions and quid pro quo behavior; and
- Denial of due process in the imposition or threat of attorney sanctions.
Each independently, and certainly collectively, implicates the integrity of the judiciary, the rights of counsel, and the interests of clients and the public.
What is most disturbing about my participation at these hearings, is that I am not allowed to record anything. You can certainly review the transcript in this matter, but the transcript is not a tell-all. Judge Fried’s demeanor, gesticulations and tone cannot be captured through a transcript. I have yet to see any other judge demonstrate hostility through body language and voice intonation, which is why I have filed this complaint. Unfortunately, due to the fact that courts prohibit my recording of any proceedings, I cannot bring full transparency to the public. This should be changed to instill confidence in the public that judicial officers will be held to account if they misbehave on the bench and seek to settle scores when they are offended.
Sincerely,
Favour Inegbenehi
