A Lawyer’s Paramount Duty: Client Directives and the Limits of Professional Courtesy
The scenario of a lawyer failing to respond to a vague communication from an adversary is a fundamental question of legal and ethical obligations. On August 25, 2025, a New York lawyer was faced with an outreach from opposing counsel that merely stated, “We want to talk.” The lawyer did not respond, acting on explicit client instructions not to engage in non-substantive outreach. This decision, though seemingly a matter of professional courtesy, was in fact a correct fulfillment of a lawyer’s primary duties under the New York Rules of Professional Conduct (NYRPC). An ethics opinion from the New York State Bar Association confirms that while a lawyer may communicate with opposing counsel in any manner they choose, opposing counsel is not required to respond to that chosen method. The rules do not mandate how lawyers must communicate with each other, and a lawyer’s duty to act with “reasonable diligence” does not require them to “press for every advantage” or abandon their obligation to treat others with courtesy and respect. There is no ethical rule in New York that compels a lawyer to respond to such a non-substantive communication, particularly when the client has given a contrary, lawful directive. This situation contrasts sharply with the mandatory duty to promptly inform a client of a settlement offer, which is a specific requirement under Rule 1.4. The vague request to “talk on the phone” was not a settlement offer, and therefore did not trigger such a duty to respond. The situation also implicates NYRPC Rule 1.4, which governs a lawyer’s communication with their own client. This rule requires a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and to consult with the client regarding decisions promptly. A critical provision within this rule mandates that a lawyer who receives a settlement offer in a civil controversy must quickly inform the client of its substance. The opposing counsel’s vague request to “talk on the phone” was not a substantive offer of settlement. As such, it did not trigger a mandatory ethical duty to respond. The lawyer’s action was not a breach of professional conduct but was, in fact, an affirmation of a paramount professional duty to their client. By following the client’s specific instruction not to engage in vague discussions, the lawyer correctly prioritized the client’s interests and autonomy over a mere professional courtesy. There is no ethical rule in New York that compels a lawyer to respond to such a non-substantive communication, particularly when the client has given a contrary, lawful directive.
The Courtroom Confrontation: A Judge’s Erroneous Assertion
This brings us to the pivotal moment in the courtroom. Following the lawyer’s decision not to respond to the vague communication, a decision rooted in strict adherence to their client’s instructions and the absence of a settlement offer, the parties appeared before Judge Loren Williams on August 25, 2025, a justice at the New York Supreme Court. Opposing counsel sent an email to their adversary stating, “We want to talk,” but the other counsel did not respond to the email because it did not entail any correspondence about proposing a settlement offer or discovery related to the case. Of course, counsel complained to Judge Loren Williams. It was at this juncture that Judge Loren Williams, in an unexpected rebuke, falsely asserted that the other lawyer had a professional obligation to respond to the opposing counsel’s outreach. This public claim from the bench immediately shifted the focus from the nuances of professional conduct to a direct challenge to the judge’s own understanding of the law they are sworn to uphold.
Judge Loren Williams’s assertion that the lawyer had an obligation to respond to the opposing counsel fundamentally misrepresents the hierarchy of ethical duties. It wrongly suggests that a lawyer’s duty to an adversary or a general norm of professional courtesy supersedes their primary obligation to their client and their client’s lawful directives. Such a public judicial statement could have a chilling effect on the legal profession, potentially coercing lawyers into acting against the explicit and lawful wishes of their clients for fear of judicial reprisal. This not only undermines the lawyer’s role as a zealous advocate but also erodes the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship, which is a cornerstone of the legal system. Judge Loren Williams’ comment, therefore, represents a conceptual flaw in understanding the very foundation of legal representation, mistaking a non-binding courtesy for a binding ethical rule.
The Judge’s Mandate: Fidelity to the Law and the Breach of the Bench
While the lawyer’s conduct was ethically sound, the judge’s public misstatement of the law represents a significant breach of their own professional obligations. The New York Code of Judicial Conduct, which governs the ethical behavior of judges, clearly mandates that a judge’s judicial duties take precedence over all other activities. A core component of these duties is outlined in 22 NYCRR 100.3(B)(1), which states, “A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it”. This is not an aspirational goal but an explicit, primary responsibility.
Judge Loren Williams’s false claim that a lawyer had an obligation to respond to an adversary’s vague communication is a direct contradiction of established professional rules. This action constitutes a failure to be “faithful to the law” and a breach of the duty to “maintain professional competence.” The nature of this failure is not a simple misstep; it is an error on a matter of legal ethics and professional conduct, which falls squarely within the judge’s adjudicative responsibilities. By making such a statement from the bench, Judge Loren Williams used the power of their office to create a non-existent legal obligation, thereby attempting to coerce a course of action on the part of the lawyers.
The question of whether this professional failure constitutes a disciplinary offense falls under the purview of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct. This independent state agency is constitutionally established to investigate complaints of ethical misconduct against judges of the New York courts. The Commission can investigate various forms of misconduct, including “gross neglect,” “favoritism,” and other behavior on or off the bench. However, the Commission cannot reverse a court decision or order a new trial, and a litigant’s unhappiness with a case’s result is not a sufficient basis for action. While a misstatement of the law is a clear violation of the duty of competence, it may not meet the high bar of “egregious” misconduct, such as fraud, deliberate deception, or gross insensitivity to constitutional rights, that often leads to a public determination of discipline.
This institutional paradox is a critical issue. The system has rules designed to hold judges accountable, yet the standard for official, public discipline is often so high that many acts of professional incompetence or overreach go unpunished. The judge’s misstatement, while a profound ethical and experienced failure, is likely to remain an unaddressed moral violation, with no formal remedy outside of a potential appeal of a subsequent ruling. This disconnect, where a clear breach of a rule has no visible consequence, makes the rules appear aspirational rather than enforceable and suggests that a judge’s subjective view or ignorance can hold more weight than established law.
Beyond the Courtroom: The Systemic Corrosion of Public Confidence
The specific incident involving Judge Loren Williams’ misstatement, while isolated, is not an anomaly. It is a micro-level event that contributes to a documented and widespread macro-level problem: the erosion of public trust in the United States judiciary. Recent polls reveal a fragile foundation of public confidence in the courts. A June 2022 Gallup poll, for instance, showed that only 25 percent of Americans have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court, a historic low and an 11-point drop from the previous year. This decline is part of a broader trend of distrust in all governmental institutions, including the presidency and Congress.
While confidence in state courts is generally higher, a recent NCSC survey reveals that trust remains far from universal, with significant concerns about the fairness and impartiality of the system. The survey found that a majority of Americans support the notion that there are “two systems of justice, one for those with influence, connections, and power, and another one for everyone else”. The poll also revealed that respondents were evenly split on whether state courts provide “equal justice to all”.
An incident like the one in the courtroom, where a judge demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding of a basic professional rule, provides tangible evidence for these pre-existing public anxieties. It validates the public’s worst fears about a judiciary that is either incompetent or deliberately uses its power to circumvent established rules for its own ends. The lack of a visible, public consequence for the judge’s error creates a sense of helplessness and futility for those who encounter it, reinforcing the perception of a two-tiered system where the powerful, including judges, are not held to the same standards as everyone else. The judge’s action is not a new problem but a symptom that reveals and exacerbates the underlying disease of systemic distrust. The judiciary’s legitimacy relies on the public’s perception of its fidelity to the law and its commitment to accountability. When this fidelity is visibly absent, as in this case, the foundation of public trust is further weakened.
The Public’s Investment: Taxpayer Dollars and the Demand for Competence
The public’s frustration is amplified by the fact that the judiciary is a publicly funded institution, with judges receiving substantial salaries. As of April 1, 2024, New York State judicial salaries range from a low of $54,100 for a part-time City Court Judge to a high of $265,600 for the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals. Other notable salaries include $232,600 for a Supreme Court Justice and $216,400 for a Judge of the Civil Court or Criminal Court in New York City. These figures represent a significant public investment, and with it comes a reasonable expectation of competence and professionalism.
The argument that high salaries should be tied to high performance is a common one, but the relationship is more complex than it appears. Academic research challenges the simple assumption that raising judicial salaries necessarily improves judicial performance or competence. A study of judicial behavior posits that salary is only one component of a judge’s overall compensation, which also includes the immense power, prestige, and life tenure associated with the office. The study argues that for judges protected by life tenure, increasing pay may not serve as a strong incentive for better performance, as they face little risk of termination for inadequate work.
The paradox is that while the public invests heavily in the judiciary, the very structure of the system particularly life tenure, which was designed to ensure independence from political pressures, removes the very accountability mechanisms (such as the risk of job loss) that motivate performance in other professions. Therefore, the problem of judicial incompetence is not necessarily one of insufficient compensation but one of ineffective accountability. Simply paying judges more may not solve the problem of professional failures. The true remedy lies in reforming accountability mechanisms to ensure that ethical and professional breaches, even those that fall short of “egregious” misconduct, are addressed in a meaningful and transparent way.
Conclusion: A Call for Fidelity and Trust
The courtroom incident on August 25, 2025, serves as a poignant illustration of the vulnerabilities within the modern American judicial system. The analysis confirms that the lawyer’s decision not to respond to the opposing counsel was not only permissible but was an ethically correct fulfillment of their duty to their client. Conversely, the judge’s misstatement of a foundational rule of professional conduct was a clear breach of their core duty to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
While this specific failure may not warrant public discipline, its impact extends far beyond the confines of the courtroom. Such judicial missteps, whether born of ignorance or overreach, contribute to a systemic corrosion of public trust. They provide tangible examples that validate the public’s fears of a system that is fundamentally unfair and incompetent. The significant public investment in judicial salaries, while a necessary component of attracting qualified candidates, does not guarantee competence in a system that lacks robust, visible accountability mechanisms for everyday professional failures.
The legitimacy of the judiciary is not granted by fiat but is earned through a continuous demonstration of fidelity to the law and a commitment to impartiality. To restore public confidence, the judiciary must not only uphold its ethical mandates but also create more effective and transparent means of addressing professional shortcomings. The judiciary relies on public respect and acceptance. The surest way to lose that trust is through a failure to adhere to established ethical standards and a failure to hold judges accountable for misconduct, even when that misconduct falls short of a public disciplinary offense. Only when the public sees that the principles of accountability and competence apply equally to all, from the newest lawyer to the most seasoned judge, can faith in the promise of “equal justice to all” be truly restored.